We propose hPIN/hTAN, a low-cost hardware-based e-banking protection scheme when the adversary has full control over the user's computer. Compared with existing hardware-based solutions, hPIN/hTAN depends on neither trusted out-of-band channel, nor secure keypad, nor data encryption. Its security is based on a cryptographic hash function and human attention. We consider the worst case of MitC attacks: the attacker has full control over the user's computer, including software, OS, and even hardware programmable via software.
• Transaction-dependent TANs or digital signature: Trusted devices with secure keypad/display
• Others: Trusted proxies, trusted computing platform, virtual machines, ...
Problems with Existing Solutions
• Trusted OOB channel may be untrusted: insecure cellular (especially GSM) network
• Trusted devices may be untrusted: mobile malware
• CAPTCHAs: prone to AI-based and human-assisted attacks
• Secure keypad: Low usability/portability, high costs
• Encryption (often asymmetric): high costs • USB-token based solution: trusted display, "OK" button.
• Two parts: hPIN for login and hTAN for transactions.
• A better balance between security and usability: human attention is effectively explored, the costs are well controlled.
• Simplistic design: Less chance of bugs and security holes.
• Three "No"s: No encryption + No secure keypad + No trusted out-of-band channel.
• Three "h"s: hardware + hash + human.
Notations
• Four parties involved: U (User), T (USB-token), C (Untrusted computer/Attacker), S (Server).
• User ID: IDU. User PIN: PIN. Shared secret: Step 1: U connects T to C (if not yet connected), and presses the "OK" button of the USB-token.
Security Requirements
Step 2: U enters IDU on the untrusted keyboard and sends it to T via C.
Step 3: For i = 1, ... , n, the following interaction is performed between T and U: a) T randomly generates a one-time code F i : X → Y, shows all codewords {F i (x)|x ∈ X} to U via its display; b) U enters F i (PIN(i)) (which is always a printable character) with the untrusted keyboard or presses the "Backspace" key if she notices the last input is wrong; c) if U presses the <Backspace> key, T performs i = i −1 and goes to Step 3a; otherwise T decodes F i (PIN(i)), shows PIN(1) · · · PIN(i) on its display for a few seconds and performs i = i + 1.
Step 4: T verifies if PIN
. If so, then T recovers the secret key as K T = K * T ⊕ h(PIN s), stores h(K T ) in its volatile memory for future use in the hTAN protocol, shows a "PIN correct" message to U via its display, and goes to Step 5; otherwise T performs C 1 = C 1 +1, shows an alert to U and stops. If C 1 > v 1 , T locks itself.
Step 5: T generates a nonce r 1 , and sends (IDU, r 1 ) to S via C.
Step 6: S generates a new nonce r 2 and sends (r 2 , H 1 = h(r 1 h(K T ) r 2 )) to T via C.
Step 7: T checks if H 1 = h(r 1 h(K T ) r 2 ). If so, T sends (IDU, H 2 = h(r 2 h(K T ) r 1 )) to S via C; otherwise issues an alert to U via its display and stops.
Step 8: S checks if H 2 = h(r 2 h(K T ) r 1 ). If so, S sets M ="success", otherwise performs C 2 = C 2 + 1 and sets M ="error". If C 2 > v 2 , S locks the user's account. Then, S sends H 1 = h(r 1 M h(K T ) M r 2 ) to T (via C).
Step 9: T checks if H 1 = h(r 1 "success" h(K T ) "success" r 2 ). If so, it displays a "success" message, otherwise an "error" message, to U. Step 1: U inputs sensitive transaction data (STD) on the untrusted keyboard of C.
To force U to verify the STD simultaneously on the trusted display of T, the STD are shown in clear only on T's display. In the online form, they appear as "*****". This requires real-time transmission of STD from C to T.
Step 2: U presses the "OK" button on T to finish STD input.
Step 3: T highlights STD for a few seconds, and prompts U to press the "OK" button again for re-confirmation.
Step 4: U presses the "OK" button for a second time to approve the STD.
Step 5: U inputs the non-sensitive transaction data (NSTD), and then clicks a "submit" button.
Step 6: T generates a nonce r 3 and sends (IDU, STD, NSTD, r 3 ) to S via C.
Step 7: S generates a new nonce r 4 and sends (r 4 , H 3 = h(STD r 3 h(K T ) r 4 )) to T via C.
Step 8: T checks if H 3 = h(STD r 3 h(K T ) r 4 ). If so, T shows a "server verified" message to U via its display and goes to the next step; otherwise it shows a "bogus server" alert to U and stops.
Step 9: T sends (IDU, H 4 = h(STD r 4 h(K T ) r 3 )) to S via C.
Step 10: S checks if H 4 = h(STD r 4 h(K T ) r 3 ). If so, S executes the requested transaction and sets M ="success", otherwise sets M ="error". Then, S sends
Step 11: T checks if H 3 = h(STD r 3 "success" h(K T ) "success" r 4 ). If so, it displays a "transaction approved" message, otherwise a "transaction failed" message, to U.
Security Analysis and Implementation
• Security based on a cryptographically secure hash function.
• PIN encrypted in the USB-token against theft and loss.
• The second half of each sub-protocol (hPIN, hTAN) can be replaced by a more complicated protocol if necessary.
• Implementation and user study is currently work in progress.
